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AN EQUALITY APPROACH TO WRONGFUL
BIRTH STATUTES
Stephanie S. Gold*
INTRODUCTION
American society is moving toward a medical and legal standard
that embraces an increasingly broad right to patients' decisional au-
tonomy. In 1973, Roe v. Wade' established that women have the right
to control their bodies and solicit medical assistance in realizing that
right. In 1990, the Supreme Court in Cruzan v. Missouri Department
of Health2 recognized the right of terminally ill patients to determine
the extent of their medical care.3 This term, the Court will consider
the right to physician-assisted suicide, a right upheld, on different
grounds, in both the Ninth4 and Second5 Circuits. Relying in large
part on Planned Parenthood v. Casey,6 which recognized the connec-
tion between liberty and decisional autonomy, the Ninth Circuit found
in Compassion in Dying v. Washington that terminally ill patients have
a constitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, a decision "central
to personal dignity and autonomy."7
Historically, this right has been labeled as a right to bodily integrity,
the "right of every individual to the possession and control of his own
person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by clear
and unquestionable authority of law."8 In the medical context, pa-
tients' right to decisional autonomy, essentially facilitated through the
receipt of information from their doctors, has been protected largely
* I would like to thank Professor Tracy E. Higgins for her insightful comments
on this Note.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
3. Id. at 278 (finding that a person has a liberty interest in determining the scope
of their medical treatment).
4. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 816 (9th Cir.) (finding that
"the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time
and manner of one's death"), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996).
5. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 729-31 (2d Cir.) (finding no rational basis for dis-
tinguishing between the decision of competent terminally-ill patients to remove artifi-
cial life support equipment and the enlistment of a physician's aid to end life), cert.
granted, 117 S. Ct. 36 (1996).
6. 505 U.S. 833, 869 (1992) (upholding the essential holding in Roe and finding
that women possess "a constitutional liberty... to have some freedom to terminate
her pregnancy").
7. Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 813 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852). The
Court found that "Casey and Cruzan provide persuasive evidence that the Constitu-
tion encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of
one's death." Id. at 816.
8. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (quoting Union
Pac. R.R. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)).
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by the threat civil litigation.9 The informed consent doctrine and
medical malpractice actions rather than administrative enforcement
have been the protective methods employed.' ° The primary incentive
for doctors to comply with informed choice has been the fear that
failure to do so will result in a large litigation settlement.
Despite early recognition of decisional autonomy in the area of re-
productive freedom, and its use as a basis for finding an autonomy
right in other contexts, ironically it is in the area of reproductive free-
dom that the law has encroached upon that autonomy the most." For
example, abortion regulations and wrongful birth statutes carve out
one category from the broader right of decisional autonomy. 2 This
exemption affects only women because only women become pregnant
and have the right to an abortion.' 3 The right to have an abortion,
9. Id. at 269 (finding that the "notion of bodily integrity has been embodied in
the requirement that informed consent is generally required for medical treatment"
and informed consent is a component of American tort law). In his dissent, Justice
Brennan also remarks that the right "to determine what shall be done with one's own
body" is grounded in American tort law. Id. at 305 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
10. Ia- (finding that the informed consent doctrine embodies the concept of bodily
integrity).
11. Perhaps even more ironic is that in assessing terminally ill patients' wishes to
die, women's views are considered less credible. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Furthering the In-
quiry: Race, Class, and Culture in the Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women,
59 Tenn. L. Rev. 487, 507 & n.112 (1992) (referring to a finding that men's moral
preferences are given more weight than women's choices). She quotes a study of
appellate decisions in right-to-die cases that uncovered the following differences in
the treatment of men and women:
The first difference is the courts' view that a man's opinions are rational and
a woman's remarks are unreflective, emotional, or immature. Second, wo-
men's moral agency in relation to medical decision is often not recognized.
Third, courts apply evidentiary standards differently to evidence about men's
and women's preferences. Fourth, life-support dependent men are seen as
subjected to medical assault; women are seen as vulnerable to medical
neglect.
Id. at 507 (quoting Steven H. Miles & Allison August, Courts, Gender and "The Right
to Die," 18 Law Med. & Health Care 85, 85, 87 (1989)).
12. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 927 (1927) (Blackmun, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part) ("In short, restrictive abortion laws force women to
endure physical invasions far more substantial than those this Court has held to vio-
late the constitutional principle of bodily integrity in other contexts."); Laurence H.
Tribe, Abortion: The Clash of Absolutes 197-210 (1990) (discussing abortion regula-
tions); Erin Daly, Reconsidering Abortion Law: Liberty, Equality, and the New Rhet-
oric of Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 45 Am. U. L. Rev. 77, 93-98, 112-16 (1995)
(discussing the informed consent provisions, spousal notification, and the abortion
funding cases).
13. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 (striking down a spousal notification provision);
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 Yale L.J. 1281,
1319-20 (1991). Professor MacKinnon notes:
Because pregnancy can be experienced only by women, and because of the
unequal social predicates and consequences pregnancy has for women, any
forced pregnancy will always deprive and hurt one sex only as a member of
her gender. Just as no man will ever become pregnant, no man will ever
need an abortion, hence be in a position to be denied one by law.
Id. at 1319-20.
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however, is a component of the larger right to "be free from medical
attention without consent, [and] to determine what shall be done with
one's own body."' 4
Separate standards for the delivery of health information to women
is not unique to the abortion context. Historically, women have been
denied health information by doctors who made assumptions about
women's capacity to make rational decisions and understand complex
medical information. 15 Much of the law and philosophy in this area
reinforces women's stereotypical roles as child-bearers and mothers.
"Woman has been judged historically as incapable of rational thought
and therefore susceptible to immorality unless controlled by man, her
intellectual and moral superior."'1 6 This vision of women as exclu-
sively mothers and caretakers associates women with children and in-
14. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 305 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); see id. at 269.
15. Professor Sylvia A. Law found that "the tradition of medical paternalism is
particularly strong in relation to women patients; doctors often assume authority to
determine what is in women's best interest without soliciting their views." Sylvia A.
Law, Silent No More: Physicians' Legal and Ethical Obligations to Patients Seeking
Abortions, 21 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 279, 295 (1994-95) [hereinafter Law,
Silent No More]. Another commentator reports that "[h]istorically, experiments and
operations have been performed on women without their consent." Lisa Napoli, The
Doctrine of Informed Consent and Women: The Achievement of Equal Value and
Equal Exercise of Autonomy, 4 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 335, 338-39 (1996) (footnotes
omitted). Moreover, this commentator found that even "[v]hen consent is sought,
women must often overcome gender-based stereotypes that impact on a doctor's deci-
sion to perform a procedure." Id. at 339.
16. Paula Abrams, The Tradition of Reproduction, 37 Ariz. L Rev. 453, 463
(1995). "Sexist assumptions affect ... the willingness of physicians to give patients
vital information." Gena Corea, The Hidden Malpractice: How American Medicine
Treats Women as Patients and Professionals 77 (1977). Corea uses the 1970 Senate
hearings on the oral contraceptive as a model for this abuse. Id. She noted that sev-
eral testifying doctors held a "woman-as-featherbrain" stereotype when testifying that
"most women were not bright enough to understand information on the Pill's adverse
effects." Id. She recounts one doctor's response to questions concerning informed
consent. Id He stated "that while some females were indeed intelligent enough to
understand data on the Pill, there were 'vast numbers of women' who did not have
inquiring minds or enough education to comprehend more than the simplest biologi-
cal facts." Id. He continued: "A misguided effort to 'inform' such women leads only
to anxiety on their part and loss of confidence in the physician .... They want him
(the doctor) to tell them what to do, not to confuse them by asking them to make
decisions beyond their comprehension .... The idea of informing such a woman is not
possible." Id. at 77-78 (quoting Dr. Joseph Goldzieher of the Southwest Foundation
for Research and Education); see id. at 242-52 (discussing the experimental use of
DES on women without providing full information).
For discussions of the medical profession's abuse of women, see Barbara
Ehrenreich & Deirdre English, For Her Own Good: 150 Years of the Experts' Advice
to Women (1978); Sheryl B. Ruzek, The Women's Health Movement: Feminist Alter-
natives to Medical Control (1978); Diana Scully, Men Who Control Women's Health:
The Miseducation of Obstetrician-Gynecologists (1994); Seizing Our Bodies (Claudia
Dreifus, ed. 1977); Carol Tavris, The Mismeasure of Woman: Why Women Are Not
the Better Sex, the Inferior Sex, or the Opposite Sex (1992).
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competent people17  and consequently limits women's right to
decisional autonomy.'
Since its origin, the medical profession has been insensitive and
even hostile to patient autonomy, especially female agency with re-
spect to medical decisions. 9 A professor of sociology at Wesleyan
University found that medical schools helped reinforce stereotypes of
hysterical women controlled by their reproductive organs.20 A study
of twenty-eight gynecology textbooks, published in the 1970s and
1980s, revealed that "[o]ne-fourth of these books contained sex-role
17. See Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong with
Fetal Rights, 10 Harv. Women's LJ. 9, 37 (1987) (stating that "pregnant women may,
by virtue of their pregnancy, be equated with children and mental incompetents and
denied decision making rights."); see also Barbara Stark, Economic Rights in the
United States and International Human Rights Law: Toward an "Entirely New Strat-
egy", 44 Hastings L.J. 79, 93 n.62 (commenting that "the public welfare provisions of
state constitutions were for the most part intended for paupers, incompetents, wo-
men, and children"); Robert D. Null, Note, Tenancy by the Entirety as an Asset Shield:
An Unjustified Safe Haven for Delinquent Child Support Obligors, 29 Val. U. L. Rev.
1057, 1082 n.193 (noting that the "common law of property afforded women, as prop-
erty of their fathers or husbands, the same status as children and mental
incompetents").
18. Abrams, supra note 16, at 454 (analyzing the effects of religion, philosophy,
and politics on the image and role of women in Western society).
19. John M. Smith, M.D., Women and Doctors 9 (1992). Smith writes:
The problems women experience in the health-care system reflect the
problems of the system in general. Women, however, are impacted on a
scale that is disproportionate to their numbers. Whether you are talking
about unnecessary surgery, inappropriate treatment or testing, lack of pre-
ventive care, lack of consideration in research, allocation of dollars, or sim-
ply being milked for dollars by physicians, women are mistreated on a major
scale.
Id. Smith observes that women, regardless of their race, wealth, or career, are abused
by doctors more often than similarly situated men. Id. He comments that doctors,
alone, should not bear responsibility for the mistreatment of women. Id. at 18-19. The
majority of abusive doctors do not realize the effects of their actions; doctors believe
that they are behaving in the best interests of their female patients. Id. at 19. Part of
this belief stems from the tremendous power that society allocates to doctors. Id. One
of those powers is the control of the "flow of information." Id.
20. Rita Baron-Faust, Why Doctors Mistreat Women, Redbook, May 1989, at 114-
15; see Karen Labacqz, Feminism and Bioethics, Second Opinion, Oct. 1991, at 16.
Karen Labacqz describes feminists' charge that:
[M]edicine, like other social institutions, does not take women's moral agency
seriously, and that traditional bioethics is deficient because it fails to recognize
and address this gender gap. Traditional bioethics is often conducted as
though we all 'know' that medicine has a benign purpose: to heal disease.
.. .Feminists charge that 'disease' itself is a social construction, that
medicine has functioned not simply to heal disease but also to reinforce sex,
class, and race stereotyping, and that the real question, therefore, is whether
the institution and practice of medicine is good for women.
Id. Labacqz also notes that a commitment to "women and women's well-being in-
cludes the conviction that women have been historically discriminated against and
that such discrimination has been built into the myths, structures, and ideologies of
the culture. It has rendered women's experiences, viewpoints, and histories 'invisi-
ble."' Id. at 19.
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stereotyping, paternalism and other forms of condescension toward
women. Some texts insinuated that a woman's primary role was child
producer and family nurturer and that women should place men's sex-
ual needs above their own."'" This evidence about the treatment of
women by the medical profession establishes a framework for consid-
eration of the motives and intent of legislators who deny informed
choice to women facing serious health decisions.
A justification often proffered for controlling women's bodies in the
reproductive health context is a state interest in fetal protection. 2 For
example, the government attempts to limit the control women possess
over their bodies through forced caesarean surgeries,2 blood transfu-
sions, sterilizations either through removal of reproductive organs24 or
implantation of Norplant,25 and criminal laws punishing pregnant wo-
men for consuming drugs or alcohol.' Women of color and poor wo-
men are most dramatically affected by this type of control. For
example, states and doctors have justified forced sterilization through
the propagation of social assumptions about women of color. One
commentator notes that:
African-American women, along with Latina (especially Puerto Ri-
can) and Native American women, were subjected to forced sterili-
zation in appalling numbers up through the 1970s, a practice that
continues in "milder" forms today. Physicians felt justified in surgi-
21. Baron-Faust, supra note 20, at 33.
22. Professor Lisa C. Ikemoto describes the effects of the state's intervention in
women's choices concerning reproductive health as devaluing "women as persons and
describ[ing] women as 'vessels,' 'mother machines,' or 'incubators."' Ikemoto, supra
note 11, at 487 (citations omitted).
23. Currently, caesarean sections are the most common major surgery performed
in the United States. Leslie G. Espinoza, Dissecting Women, Dissecting Law: The
Court-Ordering of Caesarean Section Operations and the Failure of Informed Consent
to Protect Women of Color, 13 Nat'l Black LJ. 211, 211 (1994). Espinoza also notes
that according to the Kolder study in the New England Journal of Medicine, 81% of
the court-ordered caesareans were ordered for black, Hispanic, or Asian women. Id.
at 226 (citing Veronika E.B. Kolder et al., Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions,
316 New Eng. J. Med. 1192 (1987)).
24. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the
Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist
Mindset of Law, 53 Ohio St. LJ. 1205, 1228-33 (1992) (discussing the forced steriliza-
tion of women).
25. Catherine Albiston, The Social Meaning of the Norplant Condition: Constitu-
tional Considerations of Race; Class, and Gender, 9 Berkeley Women's L.J. 9 (1994).
Norplant is a form of contraceptive that "consists of six matchstick-size silicone cap-
sules implanted under the skin of a woman's upper arm." Id. at 10. As a birth control
method, Norplant is unique because it deprives a woman of all control over her con-
traception. Id at 11. It must be surgically removed at a cost ranging from S150 to
$300. Id. at 10.
26. See Dawn Johnsen, From Driving to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Preg-
nant Women's Lives After Webster, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 179, 179 (1989); Molly McNulty,
Note, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Preg-
nant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L & Soc. Change 277, 299-
303 (1987-88).
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cally removing these women's reproductive organs without consent
because they believed them to be sexually promiscuous and either
too irresponsible or too ignorant to use birth control.27
Poor and minority women also have been targets for the coercive use
of Norplant.28 Despite tremendous side effects, 9 Norplant has been
used as an alternative to incarceration for women accused of child
abuse or drug use during pregnancy.30 As a result of the inherent bi-
ases of society, the women most often targeted for criminal prosecu-
tion are poor women and women of color.3' The Norplant policy also
has interfered with the development of more supportive, positive
methods for addressing child and drug abuse.32 Controlling women's
reproductive lives through the use of Norplant occurs in contexts
other than the criminal justice system. In fact, states have proposed
legislation that would condition the receipt of welfare on a woman's
"consent" to a Norplant implant.33
Despite a general movement toward full information for all pa-
tients, this trend is not being followed in the area of reproductive free-
dom. Wrongful birth statutes exemplify this double standard. The
wrongful birth tort is primarily a product of common law34 and re-
quires a showing that a doctor failed to provide fetal health informa-
tion which would have proven that the fetus had developmental
anomalies. In general, parents claim that if the doctor had provided
27. Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 Duke L.J. 492, 515
(1993) (footnotes omitted).
28. Albiston, supra note 25, at 11-13. For a detailed history of the Norplant con-
troversy, see Karin E. Wilinski, Note, Involuntary Contraceptive Measures: Control-
ling Women at the Expense of Human Rights, 10 B.U. Int'l L.J. 351 (1992). For a
discussion on the impact of Norplant on poor women and women of color, see Darci
E. Burrell, Essay, The Norplant Solution: Norplant and the Control of African-Ameri-
can Motherhood, 5 UCLA Women's L.J. 401 (1995).
29. Side effects of Norplant include, "headaches, depression, nervousness, en-
largement of the ovaries and/or fallopian tubes, inflammation of the skin, weight gain,
inflammation of the cervix, nausea, dizziness, acne, abnormal hair growth, tenderness
of the breasts, and prolonged or irregular bleeding." Albiston, supra note 25, at 10.
30. Id. at 11-12.
31. Id. at 12.
32. Id.
33. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Only Good Poor Woman: Unconstitutional Condi-
tions and Welfare, 72 Deny. U. L. Rev. 931, 934 & n.18 (1995) (referring to S.B. 2895,
Miss. (1992) and H.B. 3207, S.C. (1993)). Professor Roberts also observes that be-
cause Norplant must be removed surgically, government authorities can regulate poor
women more easily than with other forms of birth control. Id. at 934. Professor Rob-
erts notes that "Americans are predisposed to be less concerned about protecting the
reproductive decisions of poor women than the welfare of their children." Id.
34. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1981) (stating that "[s]tate
courts have been quick to accept wrongful birth as a cause of action since Roe v.
Wade, because it is not a significant departure from previous tort law").
35. See Basten v. United States, 848 F. Supp. 962, 969-71 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (finding
that doctor failed to inform patient of the risks of becoming pregnant while taking
oral contraceptives, that doctor failed to offer an AFP test that would have diagnosed
the neural tube defect, and that patient would have opted for the AFP test had it been
1010 [Vol. 65
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them with this information, the woman would have terminated the
pregnancy.36 Wrongful birth statutes represent a societal and legisla-
tive response to the pervasive acceptance of the tort. 7 By denying
parents the right to sue and collect damages for the wrongful birth
tort, these statutes relieve the doctor from the threat of liability and
the corollary burden of full disclosure.3
This Note argues that wrongful birth statutes violate the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Part I discusses the
tort of wrongful birth and the statutes that ban the tort. Part ]I con-
tends that a ban on wrongful birth torts is a gender-based distinction
that warrants intermediate scrutiny under the Supreme Court's Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence. This argument relies, in part, on the
acceptance of a broader, more inclusive understanding of reproduc-
tive freedom and gender equality. Finally, part MI demonstrates that
wrongful birth statutes fail intermediate scrutiny.
I. Tiim TORT OF WRONGFUL BIRTH AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF
WRONGFUL BIRTH STATUTES
This part outlines the development of the wrongful birth cause of
action and the legislative response to the tort. First, this part briefly
discusses the judiciary's varying approaches to analyzing the tort. This
part then examines the public and legislative responses to the increas-
ing acceptance of the tort. This part concludes with an analysis of the
wrongful birth statutes, which ban the cause of action for wrongful
birth.
offered). The parties stipulated that when a fetal neural tube defect is discovered,
pregnancies are terminated 90% of the time. The court found that if Ms. Basten had
known of the condition, she would have elected to have an abortion. Id. at 971; Keel
v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1024 (Ala. 1993) (stating that a wrongful birth action
"describes a claim for relief by parents who allege they would have avoided concep-
tion or would have terminated the pregnancy but for the negligence of those charged
with prenatal testing, genetic prognosticating, or counseling parents as to the likeli-
hood of giving birth to a physically or mentally impaired child").
36. Keel, 624 So. 2d at 1024.
37. See Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 749 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Billings, CJ.,
dissenting) (stating that a wrongful birth cause of action should be recognized and
that "[t]he emotional and controversial issue of abortion should not control or influ-
ence the decision in this case. Neither should the enactment of so-called 'tort reform'
legislation-the constitutionality of which must await another day.").
38. Flickinger v. Wanczyk, 843 F. Supp. 32, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that the
provisions of Pennsylvania's wrongful birth statute "clearly relieve physicians from
liability for negligently failing to provide women with information affecting abortion
decisions" (quoting Edmonds v. Western Pa. Hosp. Radiology Assoc., 607 A.2d 1083,
1088 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992))).
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A. The Development of the Wrongful Birth Tort
Wrongful birth39 actions developed out of common law principles of
negligence and medical malpractice.40 A successful action requires a
showing of all of the traditional elements of negligence.4' A plaintiff
first must prove that a duty between the physician and patient exists.42
The duty of a physician to provide prenatal information arises from
the larger duty that physicians owe their patients. Although courts
and legislatures in every state articulate the standard differently, an en
banc decision by the Supreme Court of Washington provides a general
example:
[W]e hold that parents have a right to prevent the birth of a defec-
tive child and health care providers a duty correlative to that right.
This duty requires health care providers to impart to their patients
material information as to the likelihood of future children's being
born defective, to enable the potential parents to decide whether to
avoid the conception or birth of such children.... [T]he duty also•43
requires that these procedures be performed with due care.
Although this case articulates a specific duty with respect to wrongful
birth actions, it is premised on physicians' broader legal duty to use
the "reasonable care, skill and diligence as other similarly situated
health care providers in the same general line of practice, ordinarily
have and exercise in like cases."'  A plaintiff must also prove a
breach of that duty by showing that the doctor failed to perform her
39. The wrongful birth tort is often confused with three other torts: wrongful life,
wrongful pregnancy, and wrongful conception. Wrongful life is most closely related
to wrongful birth actions. In both wrongful birth and wrongful life actions, the claim
is based on a doctor's breach of the duty to fully inform the parents of fetal birth
defects. This breach denies those parents the right to make an informed choice about
continuing the pregnancy. Unlike wrongful birth actions, a wrongful life claim is
brought by the child who was born of the pregnancy, rather than by that child's par-
ents. See John W. Wade et al., Prosser, Wade and Schwartz's Cases and Material on
Torts 421-36 (9th ed. 1994). Recognition of wrongful life claims has moved more
slowly than recognition of wrongful birth claims. Alan J. Belsky, Injury as a Matter of
Law: Is This the Answer to the Wrongful Life Dilemma?, 22 U. Bait. L. Rev. 185(1993). Wrongful pregnancy and wrongful conception deal specifically with the fail-
ure of either a birth control method or a sterilization procedure that led to the birth of
an unwanted, albeit healthy child. Wade, supra, at 434-35.
40. Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 705 (Ill. 1987) (stating
that "[mI]any courts have accepted wrongful birth as a cause of action on the theory
that it is a logical and necessary extension of existing principles of tort law"); see also
Keel, 624 So. 2d at 1030-31 (quoting Siemieniec).
41. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811 (N.Y. 1978) ("As in any cause of
action founded upon negligence, a successful plaintiff must demonstrate the existence
of a duty, the breach of which may be considered the proximate cause of the damages
suffered by the injured party").
42. See id. at 813 (recognizing a physician's duty to provide patients with prenatal
information).
43. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 491 (Wash. 1983) (en banc).
44. Belinda L. Kimble, Wrongful Birth: A Practitioner's Guide to a New Arrival,
55 Ala. Law. 84, 87 (1994) (quoting the Medical Liability Act of 1987, Ala. Code § 6-
5-542 (1987)); see Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 489 n.1 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.290
1012 [Vol. 65
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duties with reasonable care.45 In contrast to the difficulties associated
with proving duty, causation, and injury, most plaintiffs have had little
trouble establishing breach.16
Lack of proximate causation was an early ground warranting the
dismissal of wrongful birth actions. Courts believed that in order to
prove causation, a plaintiff would have to prove that the physician
caused the anomaly in the child.47 The North Carolina Supreme
Court in Azzolino v. Dingfelder s used this standard in denying a
claim for wrongful birth. The court expressed concern about the
plaintiffs' ability to prove causation adequately:
We again assume arguendo that the defendants owed the plaintiffs a
duty and that they breached that duty. The issue of whether the
breach of duty was the proximate cause of the "injury" to the plain-
tiff parents is more problematic, since even the plaintiffs acknowl-
edge that the fetus . . . was in existence and already genetically
defective at the time the defendants first came into contact with the
plaintiffs.49
Although the court dismissed the claim, it conceded that the "jurisdic-
tions which have reached the merits of claims for wrongful birth cur-
rently appear to be almost unanimous in their recognition of them. 50
Indeed, most courts now recognize the distinction between causing
the anomaly and causing the parents to lose the option to terminate
the pregnancy;51 the latter causation standard is widely accepted in
jurisdictions recognizing wrongful birth actions.5
(1975)), which articulates the physician's statutory duty to "exercise that degree of
skill, care and learning possessed by other persons in the same profession").
45. Examples of post-conception breaches include:
[P]hysician failed to disclose that anticonvulsant medication given to mother
carried high risk of birth defects (Washington); failure to warn of increased
risk of Down's Syndrome in women over thirty-five (New York); failure to
advise of availability of amniocentesis (New Jersey) and failure to timely
report its results (Delaware); failure to diagnose Rubella in mother, result-
ing in Rubella Syndrome child (Idaho); and failure to advise of the conse-
quences of Rubella in pregnant mother (Texas).
Kimble, supra note 44, at 87-88.
46. See Harbeson, 656 P.2d at 492 (finding that establishing a breach of a duty is
generally "more straightforward").
47. See Kimble, supra note 44, at 88.
48. 337 S.E.2d 528 (N.C. 1985).
49. 1l at 533.
50. Id.
51. Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 1981) ("A negligent act
need not be the sole cause of the injury complained of in order to be a proximate
cause of that injury. Moreover, the cause of action is not based on the injuries to the
fetus but on defendant's failure to diagnose.. . and inform.. . of the consequences.").
52. Keel v. Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1027 (Ala. 1993) (holding that to prove causa-
tion, "it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that, had the defendant not been negli-
gent, the plaintiff would have been aware of the possibility that the child would be
seriously defective, and either the child would not have been conceived or the preg-
nancy would have been terminated").
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Wrongful birth action plaintiffs also have difficulty proving injury.
Initially, courts were unwilling to recognize that the birth of a child,
albeit unwanted and unhealthy, could constitute a type of injury. 3
Eventually, however, courts accepted that the manipulation of infor-
mation in the wrongful birth context could constitute an injury.-4
These courts were left with the task of determining the extent of the
injury and have found it difficult to measure compensatory damages in
light of the tort's unique characteristics. Moreover, courts have split
on whether damages may be awarded for emotional distress.5 6
There still is no consensus about the extent of damages available in
wrongful birth claims. 57 Many courts refuse to award all expenses in-
volved in raising a child and permit recovery only for the extraordi-
53. In Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689 (N.J. 1967), the New Jersey Supreme
Court wrote, "[i]n order to determine their compensatory damages a court would
have to evaluate the denial to them of the intangible, unmeasurable, and complex
human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and weigh these against the alleged
emotional and money injuries." Id. at 693. The court further held that, "[w]hen the
parents say their child should not have been born, they make it impossible for a court
to measure their damages in being the mother and father of a defective child." Id.
The court felt that "[i]t is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it
however heavily burdened." Id.
54. See Robak, 658 F.2d at 477 (finding that the doctors injured the patient by
denying her information); Keel, 624 So. 2d at 1029 (finding a valid cause of action for
wrongful birth when doctor denied parents prenatal information). The Keel court
specifically stated:
Like most of the other courts that have considered this cause of action, we
hold that the parents of a genetically or congenitally defective child may
maintain an action for its wrongful birth if the birth was the result of the
negligent failure of the attending prenatal physician to discover and inform
them of the existence of fetal defects.
Id. at 1029. Thus, the denial of information was sufficient to establish injury.
55. The Illinois Supreme Court stated the general rule for calculating tort
damages:
[T]he wrongdoer is liable for all injuries resulting directly from the wrongful
acts, whether they could or should not have been foreseen by him, provided
the particular damages are the legal and natural consequences of the wrong-
ful act imputed to the defendant, and are such as might reasonably have
been anticipated.
Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 512 N.E.2d 691, 706 (IMI. 1987). The court noted
that although wrongful birth claims must meet all of the traditional negligence re-
quirements, courts have been reluctant to award the traditional amount of damages to
successful wrongful birth action plaintiffs. Id.
56. Compare Liddington v. Burns, 916 F. Supp. 1127, 1140-41 (W.D. Okla. 1996)(finding that parents could recover damages for emotional distress) with Siemieniec,
512 N.E.2d at 708 (holding that plaintiffs could not recover for emotional distress) and
Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813 (N.Y. 1978) (denying plaintiffs claim for
emotional distress damages) and Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 492-93(Wash. 1983) (en banc) (permitting recovery for emotional distress).
57. Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 706 ("The complex legal, moral, philosophical, and
social issues raised by wrongful birth claims have resulted in a -videly divergent judi-
cial treatment of damages.").
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nary costs of raising a developmentally disabled child.' For example,
the Supreme Court of Texas stated:
It is impossible for us to justify a policy which at once deprives the
parents of information by which they could elect to terminate the
pregnancy likely to produce a child with defective body, a policy
which in effect requires that the deficient embryo be carried to full
gestation until the deficient child is born, and which policy then de-
nies recovery from the tortfeasor of costs of treating and caring for
the defects of the child.59
The court permitted plaintiffs' recovery of the expenses needed to
care for the special economic burdens of raising a developmentally
disabled child, but did not allow parents to recover all of the expenses
incurred as a result of the child.Y
The decision in Roe v. Wade61 was instrumental in the widespread
recognition of wrongful birth actions.6 Even before Roe, however,
the Texas Supreme Court held in Jacobs v. Theimer,63 that a wrongful
birth action does not rely necessarily on the availability of abortion in
the particular state.' 4 The court stated: "We do not regard the issue
before us as requiring our decision of the public policy either for or
against abortion. This is a matter of very different but very deep feel-
ing.,,65 Although the incident occurred in 1968, five years before the
decision in Roe, the Texas court stated that it would assume that the
plaintiff could have obtained a legal abortion.' In finding for the
plaintiff, the court specifically held that the doctor had a responsibility
58. See Liddington, 916 F. Supp. at 1133 (holding that parents can only recover the
extraordinary expenses associated with the disability in light of the trend toward de-
nying recovery for all of the expenses incurred in raising a child); see also Keel v.
Banach, 624 So. 2d 1022, 1029-30 (Ala. 1993) (permitting recovery for the special
expenses resulting from the child's disability, but not for all expenses incurred in rais-
ing a child); cf Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1981) (permit-
ting recovery for all expenses stemming from doctor's negligence, including the entire
cost of raising a child). Some courts differentiate the duration of damage awards on
the basis of the child's age. See Siemieniec, 512 N.E.2d at 706 (stating that some courts
end damage awards when the child reaches the age of majority, while other courts
allow the award to continue because of the developmentally disabled child's inability
to support herself after reaching the age of majority).
59. Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975).
60. Id. at 850.
61. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
62. See Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (NJ. 1979) (holding that since Roe,
"[p]ublic policy now supports, rather than militates against" the recognition of a
wrongful birth claim).
63. 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975).
64. Id. In this case, the defendant doctor failed to diagnosis a pregnant woman's
rubella and consequently did not inform the plaintiff of the potential side-effects of
the rubella. Id. at 847. Subsequently, the plaintiff's baby was born with serious health
problems and the plaintiffs amassed medical bills totaling over S20,000. Id.
65. Id. at 848.
66. Id.
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to his patient to disclose all information relative to the patient's
condition.67
B. The Response to the Recognition of the Tort
Despite the tort's significant success in the court houses, many anti-
abortion activists oppose the tort and have lobbied local legislatures
to pass statutes banning the cause of action.68 At least twenty-one
states have considered passing wrongful birth statutes that would ban
wrongful birth actions.69 Six states have enacted these laws.70 A typi-
cal wrongful birth statute reads as follows: "A cause of action shall
not arise, and damages shall not be awarded, on behalf of any person,
based on the claim that but for the act or omission of another, a per-
son would not have been permitted to have been born alive but would
have been aborted."' These statutes have been challenged unsuc-
cessfully on both privacy and equal protection grounds.7 2
67. I1t
68. Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment, 100
Harv. L. Rev. 2017, 2018 n.6 (1987) [hereinafter Wrongful Birth Actions]. Anti-abor-
tion groups in Pennsylvania and Tennessee lobbied the local legislatures to pass
wrongful birth statutes. Id. In an attempt to sway the judiciary, the following four
anti-abortion groups filed amicus briefs with the Supreme Court of Minnesota in sup-
port of wrongful birth statutes: Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund, The
Catholic Health Association of the United States, The Catholic League for Religious
and Civil Rights, and The National Right to Life Committee, Inc. Id.
69. See id. at 2019 (reporting that the following states have considered wrongful
birth statutes: Alabama, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Michigan, Min-
nesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode
Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin).
70. All of the following statutes ban wrongful birth as a result of negligence; how-
ever, Idaho, Pennsylvania, and South Dakota also ban wrongful birth claims resulting
from intentional conduct. Idaho Code § 5-334 (1990); Ind. Code Ann. § 34-1-1-11
(Bums 1986 & Supp. 1996); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145.424 (West 1989); Mo. Ann. Stat.
§ 188.130 (Vernon 1996); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 8305 (1989 & Supp. 1993); S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. § 21-55-2 (1987).
71. Idaho Code § 5-334 (1990). Most of the legislation resembles model legisla-
tion distributed by Americans United for Life Legal Defense Fund. Wrongful Birth
Actions, supra note 68, at 2019 & n.9.
72. For example, in Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn.
1986), plaintiffs challenged Minnesota's wrongful birth statute on due process and
equal protection grounds. Id. The trial court found that Minnesota's legislative ban
on wrongful births actions was unconstitutional under the framework established in
Roe. The court noted that in order to violate Roe, "the state must directly affect or
impose a significant burden on a woman's right to an abortion." Id. at 13. The trial
court, however, certified the question to the Minnesota Supreme Court because of the
importance of the issue. Id. at 11.
As an initial matter, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that because wrongful
birth actions did not exist at common law, the tort should be established exclusively
by the legislature; consequently, only success on the constitutional challenges could
defeat the statute. Id at 13. Addressing the constitutional claims, the court held: (1)
there was no state action; (2) even if state action could be established, the wrongful
birth statute does not violate due process because the statute fails to "impose a signifi-
cant burden on a woman's right to an abortion;" and (3) the statute does not violate
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II. WRONGFUL BIRTH STATUTES CONSTITUTE GENDER-BASED
DISTINCTIONS AND THEREFORE WARRANT
INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
By lessening doctors' incentives to provide female patients with
complete information, wrongful birth statutes discriminate on the ba-
sis of gender, and consequently, warrant intermediate scrutiny under
equal protection because the statute permits a claim for wrongful conception while
denying a claim for wrongful birth. Id. at 13-14.
Chief Justice Amdahl, joined by Justices Wahl and Scott, wrote a critical dissent. Id.
at 18 (Amdahl, CJ., dissenting). He argued that wrongful birth statutes constitute
state action because they interfere with a woman's decisionmaking process as pro-
tected by Roe. Id. Chief Justice Amdahl found that Roe anticipated that women
choosing abortion would have access to full information, and that wrongful birth stat-
utes constituted "a subtle entry into that relationship and interference with the in-
formed decisionmaking process." Id. at 19. He summarized the state action argument
by stating:
The possibility that a doctor will be held responsible for negligent conduct
stands as a safeguard that the woman will be fully informed. The legisla-
ture's removal of the negligence action safeguard, while not preventing a
woman from actually obtaining an abortion, does harm the complete exer-
cise of a woman's rights under Roe.
Id Furthermore, Chief Justice Amdahl distinguished the funding cases cited by the
majority by finding that the funding cases did not put an obstacle in a woman's path
to obtaining an abortion. I Instead, the funding cases monetarily favored one activ-
ity over another and never interfered with the "informed decisionmaking of women."
hI
Reaching the merits of the case, Chief Justice Amdahl conceded that the United
States Supreme Court has allowed some infringement on a woman's right to choose.
He argued, however, that the Court has held unconstitutional "restrictions on the
decisionmaking process that do not assist a woman in making a more informed deci-
sion." Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 19 (citing Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 65-75 (1976), Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 639-44 (1979), and City of Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 439-49 (1983)). Thus, state action
that provides a disincentive to share information, such as wrongful birth statutes, vio-
lates Roe. Finally, Chief Justice Amdahl considered the state's justifications for the
statutes uncompelling. He noted that the two justifications that the Supreme Court
has found compelling are: "(1) protecting the woman's health, and (2) protecting the
potentiality of human life." Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 20. Vith respect to the first
justification, Chief Justice Amdahl stated, "I cannot accept as fact that physician neg-
ligence protects a woman's health." Id. He noted that, ironically, the wrongful birth
statute harms women by "not discouraging the negligent withholding of medical infor-
mation." Idr He also noted that, under Roe, the second justification only operates
after the fetus becomes viable. Id.
Since Hickman, there have been several challenges to wrongful birth statutes. The
reviewing courts, however, utilized similar rationales to deny the claims. See Edmonds
v. Western Pa. Hosp. Radiology Assocs., 607 A.2d 1083, 1088 n.5 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992). In Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A2d 816, 819 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993), the court considered inter alia an equal protection challenge to Pennsylvania's
wrongful birth statute. hI The court found that wrongful birth statutes did not dis-
criminate against any class and therefore subjected the statute to rational basis re-
view. Id. at 819. The court upheld the constitutionality of the statute; because it
believed that the government expressed legitimate state interests, and the statute was
rationally related to those interests. Id at 820.
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the Equal Protection Clause.7 3 Because doctors' responsibility to pro-
vide information to their patients has been regulated in large part by
the threat of litigation, legislatures that disallow actions for wrongful
birth inflict a heavy penalty on pregnant women by favoring the doc-
tor's judgment and power over the woman's right to make an in-
formed choice.74 Section A of this part argues that a statutory ban on
wrongful birth actions imposes a unique harm on women. The section
also contends that statutes banning wrongful birth causes of action
distinguish on the basis of pregnancy. Finally, it concludes by distin-
guishing Geduldig v. Aiello,75 a case which held that distinctions based
on pregnancy are not per se gender discriminatory. Section B asserts
that wrongful birth statutes should not be interpreted as facially neu-
tral because the statutes are gender-motivated. It also addresses the
standard established in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v.
Feeney76 and contends that the Feeney standard 77 does not apply to
wrongful birth statutes because of the factual differences in the two
73. In 1976, the Court, in Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), settled on an inter-
mediate form of scrutiny that required a state to justify a gender-based distinction
with an important governmental interest substantially related to the state's purported
goals. Id. (finding that an Oklahoma statute prohibiting the sale of 3.2% beer to males
under 21 and females under 18 failed to advance an important governmental interest
and consequently violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
74. Doctors' power in relation to female patients was at the heart of the academic
response to Roe. In Roe, the Court focused on issues of due process, specifically
privacy. To the incredulity of many critics, the opinion stressed the importance of the
doctor's autonomy and medical judgment but considered the woman as primarily a
patient and her decisions as predominately medical decisions. Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L.
Rev. 375, 376 (1985) (discussing the tremendous flood of criticism elicited by the deci-
sion in Roe). Professor Daly summarizes the impact of Roe's medical focus by stating:
When the Justices first looked at the abortion controversy in 1973, the per-
son they saw at the center of it was, above all else, a patient. She was not a
complex, multi-faceted human being in a difficult and unfortunate situation.
She was just a patient, incapable of acting on her own behalf and dependent
on the responsible judgment of another.
Daly, supra note 12, at 83. Professor Daly further concludes that if women are exclu-
sively patients, then the abortion decision is solely a medical choice and Roe is limited
to considering issues surrounding the woman's medical condition. Id. at 85.
Because the Court focused on the medical profession's rights, women's rights with
respect to issues other than medical condition were trivialized. Moreover, Roe im-
plied that the Constitution protects the doctor's judgment but not necessarily the wo-
man's decision. Thus, the doctor controls the decision to abort. Professor Daly made
the following analogy: "Substitute vasectomy (or any other elective procedure) for
abortion and the absurdity of the doctor's veto power becomes clear." Id. at 86.
Professor MacKinnon observes that Roe legalized abortion rather than decriminal-
izing it. Catharine MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 192 (1989).
She notes that as a result of Roe's privacy rationale, "[m]ost of the control that wo-
men won out of legalization has gone directly into the hands of men-husbands, doc-
tors, or fathers-and what remains in women's hands is now subject to attempted
reclamation through regulation." Id.
75. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
76. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
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situations. In addition, this section posits that wrongful birth statutes
are neither explicitly gender-based nor facially neutral. The gender
implications of a ban, however, are apparent. Section C ultimately
establishes that a ban on wrongful birth claims injures women by fail-
ing to connect equality with reproductive freedom, thereby furthering
women's subordination.
A. Bans on Wrongful Birth Actions Are Gender-Based
The first component of an equal protection challenge is establishing
the applicable level of scrutiny. Subsection 1 argues that wrongful
birth statutes discriminate on the basis of pregnancy. It comments
that wrongful birth statutes decrease doctors' incentives to provide
full information to their female patients, and therefore wrongful birth
statues distinguish between pregnant women and all other patients.
Subsection 2 asserts that the pregnancy distinction in wrongful birth
statutes constitutes gender discrimination.
1. Wrongful Birth Statutes Distinguishes on the Basis of Pregnancy
Unlike the statutes in Geduldig v. Aiello78 and General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert,79 wrongful birth statutes do not mention pregnancy. As op-
posed to regulations that exclusively prohibit pregnant women from
obtaining abortions and fail to address the male parent at all,80 dam-
ages in wrongful birth actions explicitly accrue to both women and
77. For the purposes of this Note, the "Feeney standard" refers to the test em-
ployed to infer a pretextual class-based motive from a facially-neutral statute. See id.
at 274-75.
78. 417 U.S. 484 (1974). Geduldig is an equal protection case involving a Califor-
nia statute that omitted pregnancy from coverage in an insurance scheme. Idl at 487,
489-91. The Court found that covering pregnancy would amount to a special benefit
for women even though the scheme covered exclusively male conditions. Id. at 496-97.
Most importantly, the Court found that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy was
not per se gender discrimination because the Court believed this distinction failed to
conform to the traditional equal protection framework that compares similarly situ-
ated people. See id. at 496-97.
79. 429 U.S. 125 (1976). Gilbert considered a Title VII challenge to an insurance
scheme similar to the one at issue in Geduldig. Id. at 129-33. The Court held that on
the strength of the Geduldig holding, the Court would have to find that the insurance
plan did not violate Title VII by omitting pregnancy. Id. at 133-36.
80. This does not mean that males are immune from the impact of abortion re-
strictions. Male doctors often face the penalty of an abortion restriction. As Profes-
sor Sunstein stated, "[t]he fact that some men may also be punished by abortion laws
... does not mean that restrictions on abortion are gender-neutral." Cass R. Sunstein,
The Partial Constitution 273 (1993). He makes an interesting parallel to racial segre-
gation and observes that "[l]aws calling for racial segregation make it impermissible
for whites as well as blacks to desegregate." Id. Men also are mentioned in their
capacity as husband with respect to spousal notification provisions. The Supreme
Court, however, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), held that
spousal notification is unconstitutional. Id at 895-96 (stating that "[i]t is an ines-
capable biological fact that state regulation with respect to the child a woman is carry-
ing will have a far greater impact on the mother's liberty than on the father's").
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men. Consequently, through the denial of a potential claim for dam-
ages, a statute banning wrongful birth actions harms both women and
men."' This factor complicates a gender-based equal protection argu-
ment against wrongful birth statutes. Nevertheless, wrongful birth
statutes eliminate the powerful incentive of the threat of litigation 82
which encourages the sharing of all fetal health information. Thus,
there are two distinct issues in wrongful birth actions that implicate
the Equal Protection Clause: the right to information8 3 and the right
to choose an abortion. 4
81. See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 227 A.2d 689, 690 (1967) (describing the plaintiffs
as including both the mother and the father of the child).
82. See supra notes 8-10, and accompanying text.
83. Every state has statutes designed to protect its citizens against abuse by the
medical profession. Anthony Szczygiel, Beyond Informed Consent, 21 Ohio N.U. L.
Rev. 171, 189 (1994) ("Between 1957 and 1984, every state, except Georgia, adopted a
litigation remedy for a failure to obtain informed consent."). Georgia finally adopted
informed consent legislation in 1988. Ga Code. Ann. § 31-9-6.1 (1991). The informed
consent statutes serve as a method to regulate the medical profession by supplying
doctors a critical incentive to provide patients with the full information necessary to
make important health decisions and choices, thus constituting one of the most pow-
erful forms of protection against abuse by the medical profession. See supra notes 8-
10 and accompanying text. The jurisprudential doctrine of informed consent began in
1914 with Justice Cardozo's articulation that "[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to decide what shall be done with his own body." Schloendorff
v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1914). The concept of
informed consent was refined in 1972, with the decision by the District of Columbia
Circuit in, Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1064 (1972). The court held that "[t]rue consent to what happens to one's self is the
informed exercise of a choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledge-
ably the options available and the risks attendant upon each." Id. at 780. The court
further empowered the patient by stating, "it is the prerogative of the patient, not the
physician, to determine for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie." Id.
at 781. The Supreme Court of California further clarified the right to informed
consent:
[T]he patient's right of self-decision is the measure of the physician's duty to
reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses
adequate information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the phy-
sician's communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the pa-
tient's need, and that need is whatever information is material to the
decision.
Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 11 (Cal. 1972). For a detailed analysis of the evolving
doctrine of informed consent, see Szczygiel, supra.
Professor Sylvia A. Law commented that "[p]atients' rights to self-determination
and autonomy in medical decision-making have deep historic roots and command
broad respect as abstract principles." Law, Silent No More, supra note 15, at 285. Law
later defined the right to self-determination and autonomy as characterizing the doc-
trine of informed consent. Id. at 285-88. The informed consent statutes do not com-
pletely eliminate the traditional power structure between doctor and patient-the
doctor still possesses superior scientific knowledge. The statute, however, provides a
remedy when doctors infringe on patient's decision-making autonomy, and thus bal-
ances the power more evenly.
84. This is an important distinction because equal protection has not been applied
to abortion in part because of a conception that in the reproductive health context
men and women can never be similarly situated. See Sunstein, supra note 80, at 274-
78. Wrongful birth actions, however, are different than abortion in this context. Un-
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Despite the recognizable injury to both men and women resulting
from a wrongful birth statute, women experience a unique and espe-
cially damaging injury.81 Although at the time of birth the parents
possess equal interests, during the pregnancy the woman carries the
fetus in her body, ultimately makes the decision to abort, and risks the
dangers associated with childbirth. 6 Because of the connection be-
tween the woman and the fetus,87 when she is denied information
about the health of the fetus, her doctor has injured her in a unique
way. The doctor interferes with the woman's decisionmaking auton-
omy concerning the health of her own body-including the fetus.'
Her husband is never legally denied health information in a analogous
way concerning his own body.'
In addition, while the legal interests of the father equalize with the
mother's at the time of birth, the law vests the decision to abort solely
like abortion, a procedure that men will never have to contemplate, wrongful birth
actions address the right to health information. Men are often patients and require
information from doctors. Challengers to wrongful birth statutes need not rely on the
outmoded conception that equal protection is inapplicable when real biological differ-
ences between men and women are at issue. Following this logic, an alternative argu-
ment against wrongful birth statutes would not need to rely on pregnancy. Justice
O'Connor made a parallel argument in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263 (1993). She stated that "[tihis case is not about abortion," because she
believed that the analysis should focus on whether the interference with a legally pro-
tected right provides a cause of action under the statute at issue. Id. at 354
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
85. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992) ("The mother who
carries a child to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that
only she must bear.").
86. Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence in Casey, recognized this distinction. He
stated that abortion regulations "conscript[ ] women's bodies into [the state's] service
forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in
most instances, provide years of maternal care." Id. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
87. The pregnant woman nourishes the fetus, and access to the fetus is obtained
only through her body. As Professor MacKinnon states, "[w]hat happens to it hap-
pens to her and what happens to her happens to it." MacKinnon, supra note 13, at
1314.
88. Concern over the connection of mother and fetus figures prominently in many
pregnancy regulations. One commentator found in the context of regulations of preg-
nant women and drug abuse that, "[b]ecause the fetus is both intimately connected to
and completely dependent upon the mother, virtually every act or omission by the
mother affects the fetus." Note, Rethinking (M)otherhood: Feminist Theory and State
Regulation of Pregnancy, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1325, 1340 (1990). Similarly, every illness
affecting the fetus also affects the mother. As a result of this connection between
mother and fetus, information about the health of the fetus uniquely and directly
affects the woman.
89. Professor Sunstein makes an analogous point in his discussion of equal protec-
tion in the context of abortion regulations. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 272-73. He
states that abortion regulations selectively co-opt women's bodies. Id. at 272. More-
over he states, "the government cannot impose on women alone the obligation to
protect fetuses by co-opting their bodies through law. A key point here is that in no
context does the law intrude on men's bodies in any comparable way." Id. at 273.
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in the mother." Casey established that a spousal notification 9' re-
quirement for an abortion is unconstitutional.' As a result of wrong-
ful birth statutes, the woman is not only denied personal health
information93 critical to her informed choice, but her doctor also de-
nies her a second decision-the right to an abortion-that she
uniquely possesses.94 This right to an abortion exists, in part, because
it is recognized as a component of decisional autonomy.95 Courts are
continually expanding the right to decisional autonomy and recogniz-
ing it in contexts outside of reproductive freedom. 96 Consequently,
depriving women of a component of their decisional autonomy trig-
gers heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.
Furthermore, when the state interferes with a woman's right to
choose to have an abortion, it is the woman's body that becomes con-
scripted to the state. As mentioned above, the woman bears the sum
of the risks associated with childbirth.97 Presently, abortion in the
90. See Daly, supra note 12, at 117 ("Restrictive abortion laws that unequally bur-
den women's, but not men's, capacity to define their own lives should be invalidated
as violating the equality principle.").
91. In the abortion context, the term "spousal notification" may be a misnomer.
Instead, it should be "husband" notification. A husband will never need approval
from his wife before getting an abortion because he is unable to get pregnant.
Although naming it "spousal" notification makes it seem more innocuous, the truth,
perceived by the Casey Court as well, is that the state wanted women to get approval
from their husbands before making reproductive choices. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 896-
97 (striking the spousal notification provision).
92. Id at 895. When considering the constitutionality of the spousal notification,
the Casey Court stated:
If these cases concerned a State's ability to require the mother to notify the
father before taking some action with respect to a living child raised by both,
• it would be reasonable to conclude as a general matter that the father's
interest in the welfare of the child and the mother's interest are equal.
Id. at 895-96 (emphasis added).
93. In Casey, the Court upheld states' rights to force information on women to
ensure an informed choice, because of the value of full information and the critical
nature of informed consent. Id at 883-84. The Court located a "substantial govern-
ment interest" in ensuring that women receive full information. Id. at 882-83. The
Court also noted the potential for "devastating psychological consequences" for a
woman who makes an uninformed choice in the family-planning context. Id. at 882.
In criticizing Casey's requirement that doctors disseminate certain types of informa-
tion to women seeking abortions, Professor Colker comments that "[t]here is no rea-
son to believe that physicians and nurses fail to provide adequate medical information
before performing abortions. (The threat of malpractice gives them sufficient incen-
tive to provide that information.)" Ruth Colker, Abortion & Dialogue 117 (1992). In
the wrongful birth context, this critical incentive is intentionally withdrawn.
94. Professor Anita L. Allen asserts that "abortion rights are a precondition of full
or 'first class' citizenship for women." Anita L. Allen, The Proposed Equal Protection
Fix for Abortion Law: Reflections on Citizenship, Gender, and the Constitution, 18
Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 419, 419 (1995).
95. See supra notes 1-14 and accompanying text.
96. Id.
97. The risks include not only physical injury resulting from the pregnancy, but
also risk of criminal prosecution and regulation of her activities by the state. Dawn
Johnsen lists some examples:
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first trimester is statistically safer than childbirth. 98 When her doctor
denies her critical health information, she, alone, faces the risk of
childbirth, as well as the deprivation of her decisionmaking autonomy
that includes her right to have an abortion. By inflicting a unique
harm on the woman through the denial of health information and the
right to choose to abort, wrongful birth statutes discriminate on the
basis of pregnancy.
2. Addressing Geduldig v. Aiello
Geduldig v. Aiello9 9 affects an equal protection challenge to wrong-
ful birth statutes because it holds that discrimination on the basis of
pregnancy is not per se gender discrimination. 100 Wrongful birth stat-
utes discriminate on the basis of pregnancy and consequently, an
equal protection challenge to the statutes will have to distinguish
Geduldig. The first subsection argues that Geduldig has been func-
tionally, if not explicitly, overruled; accordingly, an equal protection
challenge to wrongful birth bans may move directly to a consideration
of the legislative purpose behind the statute and the means used to
achieve the statutory goal. The second subsection maintains that,
even if Geduldig is not overruled, subsequent decisions by the Court
have limited Geduldig. In its limited form, Geduldig should not apply
to wrongful birth statutes; therefore, the Court should proceed to con-
sider the legislative purpose and means. This subsection also contends
that even if Geduldig is fully operative, the nature of the distinctions
in wrongful birth statutes differs so significantly from the distinctions
at issue in Geduldig and the distinctions anticipated by the Geduldig
Court, that Geduldig is inapplicable.
a. Geduldig Has Been Functionally Overruled
In 1974, the Court in Geduldig held that discrimination based on
pregnancy was not per se gender discrimination.' 01 In Geduldig, the
California legislature had established a disability insurance scheme
that compensated workers who contributed to the program for miss-
[Court-ordered medical treatment and surgery (including in one case sur-
gery that contributed to a woman's death); lawsuits for prenatal injuries
brought against women by their own children for not behaving like "reason-
able" pregnant women (in one case, for using antibiotics during pregnancy,
and in a second case, for driving negligently during pregnancy); criminal
prosecution for "prenatal child abuse" (for failing to follow a doctor's orders
during pregnancy) and for manslaughter (for suffering a miscarriage in a car
accident while allegedly driving while intoxicated); and even imprisonment
solely to allow the government to control directly the woman's actions for
the duration of her pregnancy.
Johnsen, supra note 26, at 193-94; see supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
98. Daly, supra note 12, at 100.
99. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
100. Id. at 496-97 & n.20.
101. Id.
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ing work as a result of an illness covered by the program. Normal
pregnancy was not covered by the insurance program. Women who
paid a part of their salary toward the insurance program challenged
that the pregnancy exception violated the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating on the basis of gender.
The Court held in the infamous footnote twenty that distinctions
based on pregnancy were not necessarily gender distinctions. The
Court stated: "The program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons."'0 The Court
also stated, however, that a "showing that distinctions involving preg-
nancy are mere pretexts designed to effect an invidious discrimination
against the members of one sex or the other" would trigger the Equal
Protection Clause.10 3
Geduldig should not interfere with an equal protection challenge to
a ban on wrongful birth because it has been functionally overruled by
subsequent decisions of the Court. Scholarly outrage at the Geduldig
rationale ensued immediately after the Court issued the decision in
1 974 .1°4 Commentators mocked the holding and assumed that the
Court would swiftly overrule itself.' °5 Although the Court has never
formally done so, the rationales of Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry
Dock Co. v. EEOC,106 UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,1°7 and Planned
Parenthood v. Casey' functionally overrule Geduldig. In Newport
News, a Title VII case, the Court held that the Pregnancy Discrimina-
tion Act not only overturned the holding of General Electric v. Gil-
bert ' 9 but also "rejected the test of discrimination employed by the
Court in that case.""'  Moreover, the Court recognized that the dis-
crimination test used in Gilbert originated in the Geduldig holding"'
102. Il at 496 n.20.
103. Id.
104. Indeed, by 1984, criticizing Geduldig already had become a "cottage industry."
Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 955, 983 (1984)
(listing a litany of articles criticizing "both the Court's approach and the result").
105. Most commentators did not think that Geduldig would survive. As early as
1977, just three years after Geduldig, Professor Karst wrote, "the constitutional sport
of Geduldig v. Aiello ... and last Term's even sillier statutory counterpart, General
Elec. Co. v. Gilbert... with their Alice-in-Wonderland view of pregnancy as a sex-
neutral phenomenon, are good candidates for early retirement." Kenneth L. Karst,
The Supreme Court 1976 Term, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 54 n.304 (1977). He further characterized the deci-
sions as "textbook examples of the effects of underrepresentation on 'legislative' in-
sensitivity." Id. Finally, Professor Karst commented, "[i]magine what the presence of
even one woman Justice would have meant to the Court's conferences." Id. Unfortu-
nately, the presence of women on the Supreme Court has not hastened the demise of
Geduldig.
106. 462 U.S. 669 (1983).
107. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
108. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
109. 429 U.S. 125 (1976); see supra note 79.
110. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676; see supra note 79.
111. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 676-77.
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and noted Justices Brennan's and Stevens's criticism of the Gilbert
holding.' Justice Stevens felt that the classification used by the ma-
jority in Gilbert which originated in the Geduldig holding was inap-
propriate; the proper classification was "between persons who face a
risk of pregnancy and those who do not."" Even members of Con-
gress remarked on the odd holdings in Geduldig and Gilbert. The
Newport News Court quoted one Senator who was involved in the
passing of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as stating that "it seems
only commonsense, that since only women can become pregnant, dis-
crimination against pregnant people is necessarily discrimination
against women.""' 4 Most of the criticisms discussed in Newport News
relating to Title VII apply with equal force to the Equal Protection
Clause. By criticizing the basis of Gilbert's rationale, the Court voiced
disagreement with Geduldig as well." 5
In UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.," 6 the Court found that the de-
fendant's policy of excluding female employees from certain jobs in
order to protect fetuses from contamination discriminated on the basis
of gender." 7 By striking down the fetal protection policy, the Court
simultaneously supported a woman's right to assess risks and deter-
mine her own best interests."8 The Court criticized the lower court's
notion that Johnson Controls's policy was not facially discrimina-
tory" 9 and found that the fetal protection policy discriminated on its
face against pregnant women and all women as a result of their poten-
112. Id. at 677-78. The Court quoted Justice Brennan as stating in his Gilbert dis-
sent that it was facially discriminatory for the company to devise "a policy that, but
for pregnancy, offers protection for all risks, even those that are 'unique to' men or
heavily male dominated." Id. (quoting Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 160 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)).
113. Id. at 678 (quoting General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 161-62 n.5
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting)). Professor MacKinnon observed that "[i]n women's
experience, sexuality and reproduction are inseparable from each other and from gen-
der." MacKinnon, supra note 74, at 184.
114. Newport News, 462 U.S. at 679 n.17. Justice Brennan voiced a similar disa-
greement in his dissent in Geduldig. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 501 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) ("In my view, by singling out for less favorable treatment a
gender-linked disability peculiar to women, the State has created a double standard
for disability compensation."). Justice Brennan stated what seems obvious:
"[D]issimilar treatment of men and women, on the basis of physical characteristics
inextricably linked to one sex, inevitably constitutes sex discrimination." Id.
115. Professor MacKinnon believes that the Newport News holding implied that the
Court was ready to reconsider the Gedudig holding. MacKinnon, supra note 13, at
1322 (stating that "the Supreme Court reached out explicitly in dicta, to a degree that
was legally unnecessary, to repudiate its former constitutional reasoning on
pregnancy").
116. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
117. Id- at 211.
118. The Court stated. "With the PDA, Congress made clear that the decision to
become pregnant or to work while being either pregnant or capable of becoming
pregnant was reserved for each individual woman to make for herself" ld. at 206.
119. Id. at 198.
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tial to be pregnant. 12° The Court further added that "the absence of a
malevolent motive does not convert a facially discriminatory policy
into a neutral policy with a discriminatory effect.' 2' Justice Black-
mun, writing for the majority, concluded as well that the pregnancy
distinction "classifie[d] on the basis of gender and childbearing capac-ity,"' 22 and later stated that this conclusion was "bolstered by the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act."'23 This language implies that the
Court reached its conclusion about the sex discrimination prior to a
consideration of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act. Most impor-
tantly, Justice Blackmun's articulation of the discrimination in John-
son Controls connected childbearing capacity with gender.' 24 Johnson
Controls thus provides the strongest evidence that Geduldig has been
overruled. 12 5
Finally, Planned Parenthood v. Casey12 6 envisions women's relation-
ship to pregnancy in a way that contradicts the essence of Geduldig.
Professor Daly observes that Casey's broader holding incorporates
and recognizes the importance to both men and women of controlling
the timing and manner of their family planning. 7 She states that
120. Id at 198-99.
121. Id at 199.
122. Id at 198.
123. Id (emphasis added).
124. Id
125. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 332 (1993) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) ("Johnson Controls, I had thought, signaled the Court's recogni-
tion that classifications based on ability to become pregnant are necessarily
discriminatory.").
126. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
127. Daly, supra note 12, at 122-23. The Court's failure to consider implications of
abortion for women's equality and equal citizenship was a primary criticism of the
Roe decision. In particular, Professor Karst noted that the abortion decision was not
limited to a "woman versus fetus[ ]" question. Karst, supra note 116 at 58. He stated
that abortion is "also a feminist issue, an issue going to women's position in society in
relation to men." Id. Consequently, he defined the abortion decision as an issue of
equal citizenship, or the "right to take responsibility for choosing one's own future."
Id.
Casey also confronts the problem of finding men and women similarly situated in
the reproductive health context. Professor Sunstein comments that compelling preg-
nancy seems unobjectionable because of society's misperception of the "natural role"
of women as mothers. He notes, however, that this compulsion exists only as a prod-
uct of legislation. Sunstein, supra note 80, at 274. Moreover, he deduces that "[t]he
question at hand is whether government has the power to turn that capacity or differ-
ence, limited as it is to one gender, into a source of social disadvantage." Id. Yet, in
many ways Casey rephrases the biological dilemma as a question of agency. The
Casey Court states: "The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a large extent on
her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in society." Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 852 (1992). As Professor Daly notes: "Put in
terms that equal protection law can understand, women and men are similarly situ-
ated because everyone has the right to 'define one's own concept of existence, of
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life."' Daly, supra note 12, at
117 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). In his concurrence, Justice Blackmun connects
the majority opinion's recognition concerning the role of women in the family with
1026 [Vol. 65
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Casey recognizes the value of simultaneous involvement in the eco-
nomic and social life of the country,- s and consequently, in contrast
to the premise in Geduldig, that denial or interference with active par-
ticipation because of a state action would likely violate equal protec-
tion.2 9 Geduldig's conception of "pregnant persons" seems unlikely
to survive Casey's recognition of the connection between reproductive
freedom and equality.' 30
b. Geduldig Has Been Limited
Even if Geduldig has not been overruled, it has been severely lim-
ited by subsequent cases. The language noted above from Newport
News, Johnson Controls, and Casey'31 militates, if not for overruling
Geduldig, then certainly for limiting it.132 In fact, most distinctions
equal protection. Casey, 505 U.S. at 928-29 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (noting the
majority's recognition of the changing role of women in the family). He states that
the assumption that "women can simply be forced to accept the 'natural' status and
incidents of motherhood-appears to rest upon a conception of women's role that has
triggered the protection of the Equal Protection Clause." Id. at 928.
128. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (stating that "[tihe ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their
ability to control their reproductive lives").
129. Daly, supra note 12, at 139 (noting that "Casey equality... recogniz[es] that
men and women have different reproductive capacities but similar life goals"). Pro-
fessor Daly summarized three important goals achieved by the Casey decision. Id. at
136-38. First, by classifying abortion rights as liberty rights, rather than privacy rights,
Casey broadened the scope of protection of abortion. Id. at 136-37. Thus the baseline
for an equal protection challenge to an abortion regulation extends beyond a medical
condition and encompasses what Casey defines as essential "attributes of per-
sonhood." I& at 137 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851). Second, Professor Daly found
that the opinion in Casey included a broader cross-section of women. Id. at 137-38.
Rather than focusing on women with whom the Court could not and did not em-
pathize, Casey addressed active working women. Id. Professor Daly explained,
"[o]nly when the Court focuses on people it identifies with and respects, can the
equality principle apply because only then is everyone situated similarly." Id. at 138.
Third, Daly found that Casey considered men and women who want to control their
own destinies. Id. Under this conception, women meet the "similarly situated" re-
quirement of equal protection that an exclusive consideration of biology denied wo-
men. Id. at 139.
130. See id.
131. See supra part II.A.2.a.
132. Dissenting in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993),
Justice Stevens also advocates for limiting Geduldig. Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Bray was a § 1985 challenge to enjoin the activities of anti-abortion activists who
interfered with women entering reproductive health clinics. Id. at 266. Justice Stevens
asserts that "opposition to conduct that a given class engages in exclusively or
predominantly, [reveals] the intent to discriminate against the class itself." Id. at 320.
Justice Stevens noted that the Court need not find that anti-abortion activists are
necessarily anti-woman. Id at 322-23. Instead, if these activists prevent women from
exercising their constitutional rights then these activists demonstrate a "sex-based"
intent. IL at 322. Justice Stevens further stated that:
The immediate and intended effect of this conspiracy was to prevent women
from obtaining abortions. Even assuming that the ultimate and indirect con-
sequence of petitioners' blockade was the legitimate and nondiscriminatory
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based on pregnancy may be considered per se gender discrimina-
tion, 33 while those that factually resemble Geduldig require a show-
ing of pretext. Regardless of the status of Geduldig, a ban on
wrongful birth actions is factually distinct from the insurance scheme
in Geduldig; consequently, the wrongful birth ban will not trigger the
Geduldig holding. In Geduldig, California excluded pregnancy from
the categories of medical conditions that its disabilities insurance plan
would cover."M Justice Stewart held that including pregnancy in the
plan would constitute a benefit to pregnant women. 35 It follows that
if the Geduldig result was reached in part because the insurance plan
at issue was considered a benefits plan,'36 then wrongful birth statutes
stand on completely different ground. 37 Because wrongful birth bans
deny claims for relief from a tortious act, they are closer to penalties
than benefits.' 38 The right to information, whether founded in the due
goal of saving potential life, it is undeniable that the conspirators immediate
purpose was to affect the conduct of women. Moreover, petitioners target
women because of their sex, specifically, because of their capacity to become
pregnant and to have an abortion.
Id. at 323. Justice Stevens broke down the analysis by stating that "[a] classification is
sex-based if it classifies on the basis of sex." Id. at n.20. He added that since only
women become pregnant, a categorization based on pregnancy necessarily distin-
guishes on the basis of sex. Id This type of analysis applies to an equal protection
context and would essentially overrule Geduldig.
133. Professor Colker comments that the Geduldig Court, rather than misunder-
standing that pregnancy is a sex based classification, classified pregnancy distinctions
as less egregious or even benign classifications because the distinctions were based on
real sex differences. Colker, supra note 93, at 91-92. Professor Colker, however, be-
lieves that the Court erred in considering Geduldig as an issue of biological difference.
Id. at 92. Instead, she argues, Geduldig was essentially about paying for the costs of
pregnancy. Id.
134. As the dissent pointed out, the plan did cover prostatectomies, an operation
that women will not need. Geduldig v. Aello, 417 U.S. 484, 499-01 (1974) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
135. l at 497 (stating that "there is no risk from which women are protected and
men are not").
136. Justice Stewart specifically stated that "California intended to establish this
benefit system as an insurance program." Id. at 492.
137. Justice Stevens makes this point in his dissent in Bray, stating: "Central to the
holding in Geduldig was the Court's belief that the disability insurance system before
it was a plan that conferred benefits evenly on men and women." Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 327-28 (1993). Justice Stevens cites Nashville
Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S. 136 (1977), in support of limiting Geduldig. Bray, 506 U.S.
at 328. In Nashville Gas, an employer denied to grant seniority status to women re-
turning from pregnancy leave. The Court found that this action imposed a burden,
rather than denying a benefit, on women. Nashville Gas, 434 U.S. at 142. On this
basis, Justice Stevens distinguished Geduldig.
138. The abortion funding cases hinged, to a large extent, on the distinction be-
tween conferring benefits and imposing penalties. The Supreme Court in Rust v. Sul-
livan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), held that denial of funds to women seeking abortions did
not infringe on their ability to obtain abortions, because "[a] refusal to fund [a] pro-
tected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the imposition of a 'penalty' on
that activity." Itt. at 193 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 317 n.19 (1980)); see
Bray, 506 U.S. at 328 n.27 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The abortion-funding cases...
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process liberty right of the Fourteenth Amendment, common law
holdings, or in informed consent statutes, has not been interpreted as
a benefit. Thus, wrongful birth statutes, which impede full disclosure,
infringe upon that right and more closely resemble a penalty than a
benefit as defined in Geduldig.
Even in Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 39 Justice
Scalia's reference to Geduldig does not guarantee that the Geduldig
holding retains broad precedential value."4 Writing for the majority,
Justice Scalia interprets § 1985 to require proof of hostility, or pater-
nalism, to women rather than merely gender-specific action. 4' Both
Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor emphasize this distinction in
their dissents.' 4 They both recognize the differences between this
standard and the equal protection standard. Indeed, Justice Stevens,
similarly turn on the distinction between the denial of monetary benefits and the im-
position of a burden.").
139. 506 U.S. 263 (1993).
140. In Bray, the Court denied respondents the right to enjoin zealous abortion
protestors under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Id. at 267-78. Section 1985(3) gives private citi-
zens the right to sue other private citizens for interference with the exercise of consti-
tutionally protected rights. Id. The complaining party, in this case, must prove that
protestors evinced an invidious class-based animus. Id. Justice Scalia. relying in part
on Geduldig, reasoned that the protestors' activities only coincidentally implicated
women because the purpose of the protest was to discourage abortion. Id. at 269-70.
Justice Scalia argued that a clearer case would exist if people wearing yarmulkes were
in some way penalized because, in this circumstance it could be inferred that the ob-
jector's activity was targeted at Jewish people. Id at 270. The fault in this logic is
clear: Just as only Jewish people wear yarmulkes, only women get abortions. Fur-
thermore, the class Justice Scalia describes consists only of religious Jewish men. It is
clear that the only plausible objection to yarmulkes is that they are worn by Jewish
people, whereas people object to abortion because of the nature of the act, not exclu-
sively because women engage in the act. Nevertheless, as Justice Stevens points out in
his Bray dissent, one legitimate purpose does not cure an illegitimate purpose. Id. at
323. The illegitimate purpose in this case was the intent to stop women from exercis-
ing their right to obtain an abortion. Moreover, after Casey, it seems troubling, or
arguably impossible, to dissociate the class of women from the right to abortion.
141. Id. at 268-73.
142. Id at 326-27, 352 (Stevens, O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice
Stevens argues that, for the purpose of § 1985, a class-based animus does not require
proof of hostility to a particular woman. The only proof required to succeed is that
the conspiracy is aimed at interfering with an activity in which a particular class exclu-
sively participates. Justice Stevens quotes Professor Sunstein's conclusion that "[ilf a
law said that 'no woman' may obtain an abortion, it should readily be seen as a sex-
based classification. A law saying 'no person' may obtain an abortion has the same
meaning." Id. at 323 n.20 (quoting Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law
(With Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L Rev.
1, 32 n.122 (1992)).
Professor Colker observes that "[t]he Klan ... was found to have a class-based
animus against blacks despite the fact that it targeted both blacks and their support-
ers." Ruth Colker, Pregnant Men: Practice, Theory, and the Law 124 (1994). She
correctly points out that Operation Rescue's activities arguably should be more obvi-
ous because they never target men's "sex lives or reproductive choices," and their
activities block all women from entering into clinics, not simply those women seeking
abortions. Id. She also observes that their activities affect the most disadvantaged
women who are forced to go to clinics rather than private doctors. Id.
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focusing on the limited nature of the Geduldig holding, quotes Profes-
sor Sunstein as stating that "[i]t is by no means clear that Geduldig
would be extended to a case in which pregnant people were (for ex-
ample) forced to stay indoors in certain periods, or subjected to some
other unique criminal or civil disability.' 43 A ban on wrongful birth
actions denies women a remedy for a civil wrong and consequently
may fall under the category described by Professor Sunstein.
B. Wrongful Birth Statutes Do Not Have to Pass the
Feeney Standard
Four years after Geduldig, the Court, in Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 44 articulated the test to determine pretext
for facially neutral statutes. 45 This section will argue that wrongful
birth statutes are not facially neutral and thus should not be subjected
to the Feeney test. The section will also contend that, even if the
Court finds that wrongful birth statutes are facially neutral, the facts
in Feeney differ so greatly from the circumstances around a wrongful
birth action that a new test would have to be articulated.
1. Wrongful Birth Statutes Fall in Between Facially Discriminatory
and Facially Neutral Statutes
Even giving Geduldig the broadest possible reading, the Court's
holding is limited to a finding that pregnancy discrimination is not per
se gender discrimination. It does not follow from that finding that
pregnancy discrimination is facially neutral. 46 Given the intense criti-
cism and subsequent weakening of Geduldig, it would require a strong
143. Id. at 327 n.24 (quoting Cass Sunstein, Neutrality in Constitutional Law (With
Special Reference to Pornography, Abortion, and Surrogacy), 92 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 32
n.122 (1992)).
144. 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
145. Id. The Feeney test states that a plaintiff must prove "that the decision-maker
... selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not
merely 'in spite of its adverse effects upon an identifiable group." Id. at 279.
146. Although the Court held that a petitioner would have to prove pretext if preg-
nancy distinctions were found to be facially neutral, the Court never claimed that all
pregnancy distinctions are in fact facially neutral. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,
496-97 n.20. The Court stated: "While it is true that only women can become preg-
nant, it does not follow that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a
sex-based classification .... ." Id. at 496 n.20. In other words, some pregnancy-based
distinctions are discriminatory. Ironically, from Justice Stewart's statement, it appears
that he was operating from a presumption that pregnancy-based distinctions were in
fact sex-based distinctions. Although the Court states that a showing of pretext may
be necessary, that requirement is qualified by the specifics of the case. Id. at 496-97 &
n.20. Justice Stewart states that absent a showing of pretext, "lawmakers are constitu-
tionally free to include or exclude pregnancy from the coverage of legislation such as
this on any reasonable basis, just as with respect to any other physical condition." Id.
In other words, with respect to insurance coverage, a legislature can exclude gender-
linked conditions unless pretext is proven. It does not follow from these statements
that all pregnancy distinctions are facially neutral, or that women challenging preg-
nancy distinctions will have to prove pretext in all cases.
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overreading of the holding to conclude that pregnancy-based distinc-
tions both never equal sex discrimination and are always facially neu-
tral. 47 Furthermore, in light of Casey's recognition of the connection
between issues surrounding pregnancy and gender equality, it is diffi-
cult to find that pregnancy discrimination fails to implicate gender.148
2. A Ban on Wrongful Birth Actions Is Factually Different from
the Feeney Statute
Even if the Court determines that wrongful birth statutes are gen-
der neutral, they are not gender neutral in the same way as the statute
at issue in Feeney. Specifically, wrongful birth statutes differ from the
statute in Feeney because the gender classification in the wrongful
birth statutes is more explicit. The Feeney Court found that a vet-
eran's preference statute simply displayed a preference for veterans,
not a penalty on non-veterans, a category including both men and wo-
men.'49 Although the statute disproportionately impacted women,
the plaintiff had to prove that the legislature was motivated in part
"because of" a gender bias.150 The dissent criticized the holding, not-
ing: "That a legislature seeks to advantage one group does not, as a
matter of logic or of common sense, exclude the possibility that it also
intends to disadvantage another.' 151 Justice Stevens, joined in his
concurrence by Justice White, stated that the test for uncovering a
covert motive should be "the same as the question whether its adverse
effects reflect invidious gender-based discrimination."152 Justice Ste-
vens, however, failed to find invidious gender-based discrimination
because so many men were also harmed by the veterans preference
statute.53 Whereas the injured parties in Feeney-non-veterans-in-
clude both men and women, the injured parties in wrongful birth stat-
utes-pregnant persons-include women exclusively, not merely
disproportionately.
147. See Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 327 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("Geduldig, of course, did not purport to establish that, as a matter of
logic, a classification based on pregnancy is gender neutraL").
148. For a discussion of the significance of gender implications, see infra part IL.C.
Stevens stated that Geduldig should not be "understood as holding that, as a matter of
law, pregnancy-based classifications never violate the Equal Protection Clause." Id.
In Bray, Justice Scalia seemed to argue that activities that interfere with a woman's
right to have an abortion are not gender based, and that it is mere coincidence that
these regulations only harm women. Id at 269-71. This reasoning, however, appears
to contradict the holding in Casey, which formally connects abortion with gender and
equality. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text. The effect of Bray is unclear,
because of this contradiction and the four strongly worded dissents in Bray.
149. Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280 (1979).
150. Id at 279.
151. Id at 282 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152. Id. at 281 (Stevens, J., concurring).
153. Id.
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Moreover, the Feeney Court avoided over-interpreting the veterans
preference statute by looking to its plain meaning. The Court stated
that, "the law remains what it purports to be: a preference for veter-
ans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex, not for men over
women."'154 Wrongful birth statutes ban tort actions which claim that,
had a doctor provided full information about the condition of the fe-
tus, the pregnant woman would have chosen to have an abortion. 155
Applying the Feeney Court's logic, and looking to the plain language
of the wrongful birth statute, a legislature defending a wrongful birth
statute would have to say that it preferred that pregnant women re-
ceived less information. 56 Unlike in Feeney, with respect to wrongful
birth actions, the Court could not look directly to the language of the
statute to find its purpose and uphold the distinction. The direct effect
of wrongful birth statutes157 is to deny a claim for wrongful birth, a
tort that penalizes doctors for withholding information and thereby
interfering with a woman's right to choose to terminate her preg-
nancy.158 The Court is unlikely to accept a legislative preference for
154. Idt at 280.
155. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
156. The legislature in Feeney claimed that they never thought consciously of wo-
men and were exclusively focused on veterans. See Colker, supra note 93, at 90. In
light of the times and the nature of the preference, it is entirely possible that the
legislature, in fact, did not consider women at all. Nevertheless, Professor Colker
insists that legislatures should be required to "wrestle with a statute's impact on wo-
men." Id. In fact, she criticizes that "[a]n unthinking attitude can be as harmful to
women as direct animus, because it serves to keep women's interests in society invisi-
ble." Id. Interestingly, Professor Colker's solution would not require a new articula-
tion of the equal protection test. Instead, she suggests that intent remain a factor, but
that the definition and breadth of intent should change in order to require legislatures
to consider the impact of their action on women. Id. at 90-91. The legislature may not
inflict hardships on women that it would not inflict on men. Id. at 91.
In the wrongful birth context, however, a legislature could not claim that it did not
consider women. Pregnant women are the main focus of the law. Although the legis-
lature may have primarily considered fetuses, they also must have considered the im-
pact or implications of this legislation on women. In Feeney, there were non-veterans
who were male. In contrast, with regard to wrongful birth statutes, there are no preg-
nant men to consider, and the subject matter of the statute deals directly with an issue
of women's health, specifically abortion, that only women can choose. As Professor
MacKinnon has stated, "[n]o men are denied abortions .... Such a statutory impact
would be far more one-sided than, for example, the impact of veterans' preference
statutes . . . ." MacKinnon, supra note 13, at 1321.
157. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
158. A legislature might argue that the statute is intended to eliminate all tort
claims that rely on the theory that life is a harm. This argument, however, does not
respond to the actual wrongful birth action that does not rely on a finding that life is a
harm, but locates the harm in the doctor's withholding of critical information. See
supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text; see also Kimble supra note 44, at 86
("'Wrongful birth' is a misleading and unfortunate term. A more apt title would be
'wrongful information."').
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withholding information from pregnant women as support of the neu-
trality of wrongful birth statutes. 59
C. The Gender Implications of Wrongful Birth Torts Are Evident
This section maintains that although a ban on wrongful birth actions
is neither gender-based on its face nor facially neutral, the gender im-
plications of the statute warrant intermediate scrutiny. 60 This section
discusses the gender implications of a ban on wrongful birth actions
159. Even if forced to argue that wrongful birth statutes must be subjected to Fee-
ney, there is a strong argument that challengers to wrongful birth statutes would meet
the standard of proof required to find gender discrimination. Legislatures pass
wrongful birth statues in part "because of" a discriminatory intent. The fact that the
legislature may have other reasons is not sufficient to cure a finding of sex-based
discrimination. In a footnote in Feeney, the court admitted that "[w]hat a legislature
or any official entity is 'up to' may be plain from the results its actions achieve, or the
results they avoid." Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279 n.24.
It is partially because of a mistrust of women and women's ability to make rational
decisions that legislatures ban wrongful birth actions. Wrongful birth statutes do not
simply deny a benefit, they proactively deny what Casey identifies as a right under the
Fourteenth Amendment, and what states consider a statutory right under the in-
formed consent statutes. The seriousness of the deprivation alone should alert courts
to the intent of the statute.
In the words of the Feeney majority, "[i]f the impact of this statute could not be
plausibly explained on a neutral ground, impact itself would signal that the real classi-
fication made by the law was in fact not neutraL" Id. at 275. In Feeney, the Court
found that the preference for veterans impacted women because they were non-veter-
ans, not because they were women. Id In contrast, the wrongful birth statutes impact
women because only women can be pregnant. Because wrongful birth statutes are
closer to penalties than benefits, there is no alternative way to view the impact. See
supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text. It is plausible that a legislature could
focus on a party receiving a benefit without considering the deprivation that it entails,
but when a statute only operates to deny a right, the legislature cannot avoid consid-
ering the party denied. Although pregnancy alone may not be enough to warrant
intermediate scrutiny, the long historical mistrust of women's decision-making ability
provides powerful evidence that the legislation was enacted because women make this
decision. See supra notes 11-33 and accompanying text. For example, a state might
say that under the stress of learning about a disabled fetus, a woman might be unable
to make a rational decision, and consequently, the state needs wrongful birth statutes
in order to place such an important difficult decision in the hands of a doctor, a ra-
tional decision-maker. This justification, however, presupposes a sex-based distinc-
tion and defends this distinction with "the very stereotype the law condemns." J.E.B.
v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 1426 (1994) (citations omitted).
160. Some critics might call this approach an anti-subordination analysis of state
action. For example, Professor Colker describes anti-subordination principles as
prohibiting policies that "perpetuate racial or sexual hierarchy." Colker, supra note
93, at 87. She gives the example that a policy prohibiting the employment of people
with primary child care responsibilities may be phrased in gender neutral terms, yet
has a disparate impact on women and "would perpetuate a history of sexual hierarchy
by penalizing women for their societally imposed childcare responsibilities." Id. The
anti-subordination method focuses on the group of women, or the unequal class of
persons, before considering the motives of the oppressor, or dominant class, and in
preference to the impact on the individual harmed by the policy. See id.
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and the consequences of compelled pregnancy. 161 It argues that
wrongful birth statutes are not facially neutral because they violate
the principles of equality established in Casey and impose a status in-
jury on women.' 62 This section asserts that, assuming Johnson Con-
trols overruled or limited Geduldig, Casey links abortion and equality
so that wrongful birth statutes run afoul of the Equal Protection
Clause by permitting legislative interference with a woman's informed
reproductive choices and propagating sexual hierarchy.
Casey linked abortion with equality by recognizing women's reli-
ance on the availability of abortion to plan the course of their lives.163
Casey also valued women's options and voices in a way absent from
most prior decisions on abortion. 64 The Court stated that "[t]he abil-
161. Professor West also argues against compelling pregnancy. Her analysis begins
with the premise:
We all fundamentally possess a right to live in a just society .... To whatever
degree we fail to create the minimal conditions for a just society, we also
have a right, individually and fundamentally, to be shielded from the most
dire or simply the most damaging consequences of that failure.
Robin L. West, The Nature of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on Professor
Brownstein's Analysis of Casey, 45 Hastings L.J. 961, 964-65 (1994). Professor West
adds that in a perfect world, equal citizenship is not burdened by connections or rela-
tions such as motherhood, fatherhood, or sisterhood, but those relations are in fact
central to citizenship. Id. at 965. Consequently, "[w]e must have the right to opt out
of an unjust patriarchal world that visits unequal but unparalleled harms upon women
... with unwanted pregnancies." Id. Similar to the anti-subordination argument, West
discusses the existence of real inequities and dominance in society. See id. at 966.
Professor West concludes that as long as we live in a patriarchal society that punishes
and oppresses women because of their status as mothers, the abortion right must exist
in its most liberal and unencumbered state. See id. at 966-67.
162. This type of analysis has been employed successfully in the race context. Pro-
fessor Colker noted that the Court in the Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), opinion considered issues of anti-subordination. Colker, supra note 93, at 93-
94. The Brown Court contemplated the impact of segregation on the subordination of
black children. In accepting the lower court's findings, the Supreme Court held that
segregated school systems would cultivate a perception of "inferiority" of the black
children. Id. Also, the Court did not consider the desegregation of institutions at-
tended exclusively by black students, the Court only desegregated the white institu-
tions. Evidently, the Court's primary concern was the impact of segregation on the
black students. Id. at 94.
163. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (1992).
164. At first blush, the Casey Court's focus on women's choices appears to ask what
Katharine Bartlett calls the "woman question." Professor Katharine Bartlett defines
asking the woman question as "examining how the law fails to take into account the
experiences and values that seem more typical of women than of men, for whatever
reason, or how existing legal standards and concepts might disadvantage women."
Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods in Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations
551 (D. Kelly Weisberg, ed. 1993). The abortion decisions have failed dramatically to
consider how women look at abortion and the effect of the abortion decision on wo-
men. See Shelley A. Ryan, Wrongful Birth: False Representations of Women's Repro-
ductive Lives, 78 Minn. L. Rev. 857, 896-903 (1994) (discussing courts' failure to
consider and understand the way women make reproductive health decisions). Pro-
fessor Erin Daly theorizes that perhaps judicial inattention to women is explainable
because the penalties in most abortion statutes are not directed specifically at the
pregnant woman. Daly, supra note 12, at 98-99. This fact, however, provides no justi-
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ity of women to participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their repro-
ductive lives."'165 By recognizing that women actively participate in
the workforce and that abortion plays heavily in women's continued
freedom, Casey redefined abortion as an issue of equal citizenship."
Allowing legislatures to remove doctors' primary incentive to pro-
vide the information necessary for women to make informed repro-
ductive health decisions contradicts Casey's purpose. Although Casey
upheld the abortion right on due process grounds, the Court recog-
nized the importance of reproductive freedom to equality. 67 Casey's
equality principle should not on one hand value abortion as necessary
fication for ignoring the experiences of the person most affected by the regulations
and evinces a protective or paternalistic attitude toward women. See id. at 94 (noting
that the only other patients who are required to get informed consent are those "com-
mitted to the Missouri State chest hospital... or to mental or correctional institu-
tions" (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66 n.6 (1976))).
Another indicator that the Court is not asking the woman question, is the Court's
characterization of pregnant women as victims instead of active autonomous persons
seeking abortion. See id. at 98-105. The Court's perceptions are evident in its opinions
which fail to provide a complete factual picture of the women bringing the actions. Id.
at 112-16. Although the opinion primarily impacts the woman's life, her factual con-
dition is rarely mentioned in detail. Id. If women are perceived solely as victims, they
cease being individuals with rights and voices. Compare this picture with the right-to-
die cases. Although Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 794-95 (9th
Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996), dealt with physician-assisted suicide, the opin-
ion dedicated several pages to the dying person's story. See Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't
of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 265-68 (1990). Thus, the abortion decisions actively partici-
pate in silencing women on an issue that directly affects women's freedom. By erasing
the individual woman from the picture, these opinions also eliminate any possibility of
viewing abortion restrictions as discrimination.
Although Casey appears to ask the "woman question" by considering how women
perceive abortion, it fails to consider the answers to the question in its ultimate deci-
sion. This is evident in the opinion because the Court considers the impact of abor-
tion on women's lives yet upholds tremendously oppressive regulations. For example,
the Court quickly dismisses the financial and emotional burden imposed on women
by the mandatory waiting periods. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 886
(1992). In addition, through the "informed consent" regulation, the Court ignores the
fact that most women contemplate and consider the decision to terminate their preg-
nancy prior to visiting their doctor. See id. at 881-85; Ryan, supra at 896-903.
165. Casey, 505 U.S. at 856.
166. The Casey Court also reordered the priorities of constitutional protections.
Roe had focused on the doctor-patient relationship, but Casey stated that this rela-
tionship "does not underlie or override the two more general rights under which the
abortion right is justified: the right to make family decisions and the right to physical
autonomy." Casey, 505 U.S. at 884. This clarification is critical to an equal protection
analysis because it envisions women as decision-makers rather than as objects of doc-
tors' judgments. This vision forms the foundation for the comparison between men
and women. In light of the fact that women are still primarily responsible for chil-
drearing, the decision to give birth is a life decision that affects all other decisions
made by women. As Professor Daly concludes, "[b]ecause of the profound effects of
pregnancy on a woman's body and the responsibilities entailed in raising children,
reproductive rights, perhaps more than anything else, define the degree to which wo-
men can control the course of their lives." Daly, supra note 12, at 136.
167. See supra notes 126-30 and accompanying text.
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to women's equal participation in society and on the other hand per-
mit a legislature to deny health information necessary for a woman to
make an informed choice. Although Casey permits legislative curtail-
ment of access to abortion, it is unlikely that the Court would support
manipulation of health information as a method of limitation. In fact,
Casey and previous abortion decisions have specifically disallowed the
withholding or tampering of information given to pregnant women
contemplating abortion."
As Casey seems to recognize, the denial of reproductive freedom
and choice inflicts a status harm on women and reinforces the sexual
hierarchy already in existence. Similarly, wrongful birth statutes inter-
fere with a woman's right to make an informed choice to have an
abortion. Denying women the information necessary to choose to
have an abortion also forces women to bear children that they would
otherwise abort. 169  Pregnancy coerced by the state also obligates
168. The Court's holdings in Casey, Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462
U.S. 416 (1983), and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986), display the Court's disapproval of states' attempts to ma-
nipulate health information. In Akron, the Court found that a statute requiring
doctors to provide information "designed to influence the woman's informed choice
between abortion or childbirth" violated the Constitution. Akron 462 U.S. at 444.
The Court also invalidated similar provisions in Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 763-65. In
Casey, the Court allowed the "informed consent" provision on the condition that the
information provided to women be "truthful, nonmisleading information." Casey, 505
U.S. at 882 (1992); see also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,76-77 (1976)
(stating that "[t]he decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often stressful one,
and it is desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences," and noting that informed consent "insure[d] that the pregnant woman
retain[ed] control over the discretion of her consulting physician").
169. Ronald Dworkin compares compelled pregnancy to slavery because a wo-
man's body becomes conscripted to the state for the state's purpose. Ronald M.
Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individ-
ual Freedom 103 (1994). He states, "[a] woman who is forced to bear a child she does
not want because she cannot have an early and safe abortion is no longer in charge of
her own body: the law has imposed a kind of slavery on her." Id. For a fictional satire
depicting abortion regulations as a form of slavery, see Margaret Atwood, The Hand-
maid's Tale (1986).
The pregnancy also may affect the woman's relationship to people around her.
Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body. A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regula-
tion and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 373-75 (1992). Society
has imposed normative judgments on the proper behavior of pregnant women. Id. A
pregnant woman is likely to feel compelled by these normative standards to alter the
way she works, recreates, eats, drinks, and exercises. Id. at 373. A pregnant woman
with no viable option of abortion may feel compelled to stay in a damaging or un-
fulfllling relationship. Id. at 374-75. In addition, the actions of those around the preg-
nant woman may change because of her status. Id. at 374. As a result of her
pregnancy, the people around her may treat "her with love and respect or, alterna-
tively, abuse her as a burden, scorn her as unwed, or judge her as unfit for employ-
ment." Idt After giving birth, the woman must produce most of the labor "necessary
to make infants into adults." Idt at 375. As a result, she must reorder her life to
accommodate the needs of a growing child, or face the stigmatism of a bad mother.
Id. at 375-76. Generally, fathers are not required to exert this type of energy. Id.
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most women to raise their children. 70 Furthermore, children with de-
velopmental anomalies are less likely to be adopted, making this op-
tion unbearably difficult. Raising a child with developmental
anomalies subjects the woman to extreme financial obligations and
forces her to confront the possibility that her child will die at an early
age. 17 1 Because men are not generally held responsible for the pri-
mary care of their children, the job of childcare is reduced to "wo-
men's work."'1 72 Women often are forced to forgo educational and
employment opportunities as a result of state-compelled motherhood,
yet the state fails to correct the conditions underlying the inequities.173
This is especially true in the case of developmentally disabled chil-
dren. Women may be forced to leave the workforce in order to care
for children with special needs. Consequently, denying women critical
health information further lowers the position of women in society
relative to men.
III. WRONGFUL BIRTH STATUTES FAIL INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY
As demonstrated above, because wrongful birth statutes discrimi-
nate on the basis of gender, they should be evaluated under interme-
diate scrutiny. Courts determining whether a state action violates the
Equal Protection Clause employ a two-step analysis. The first step
scrutinizes the purpose of the discriminatory action. 74 Intermediate
scrutiny requires that the state actors justify a discriminatory statute
or policy with an "important" governmental purpose.175 When deter-
mining the importance of a legislative purpose, the Court generally
employs an antidiscrimination approach that considers
170. Siegel, supra note 169, at 371-72. Professor Siegel notes that "[w]omen will
also experience particularly intense pressure to raise a child if the child lacks the privi-
leged characteristics that ensure it will be readily adopted." lad at 372.
171. See Basten v. United States, 848 F. Supp. 962, 972-73 (M.D. Ala. 1994) (finding
that the extraordinary damages associated with the condition, not including emotional
damages, totaled $2,650,000); Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir.
1981) (finding damages totaling at least $900,000, a figure that did not include the
costs of raising a healthy child).
172. See Siegel, supra note 169, at 376-77 ("Childcare remains status work, organ-
ized and valued in ways that limit the life prospects of those who perform it."). The
term "women's work" is associated with unpaid labor, performed "under conditions
of economic dependency." Id Professor Siegel adds:
[A] woman who becomes a parent will likely find that the energy she invests
in childrearing will compromise her already constrained opportunities and
impair her already unequal compensation in the work force.... Considered
in cold dollar terms, it is the institution of motherhood that gives a gendered
structure to the economics of family life, and a gendered face to poverty in
the nation's life.
Id Compelling pregnancy and forcing motherhood will propagate the sexual hierar-
chy already in existence.
173. Id at 377.
174. Mfississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
175. Id
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whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic
notions. Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or "protect"
members of one gender because they are presumed to suffer from
an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is
illegitimate. 7 6
Courts may also consider whether the purpose imposes a status injury
on women.177 The second step of the analysis involves a consideration
of the means adopted by the state actor.' 78 Under an intermediate
tier analysis, the means must be substantially related to achieving the
purported goal.
179
A. Legislative Purposes
The Supreme Court has recognized explicitly two legislative pur-
poses in the area of reproductive freedom that are likely to qualify as
"important" in the wrongful birth context: "(1) protecting the wo-
man's health, and (2) protecting the potentiality of human life."' 0
Because the Supreme Court found these purposes valid, a court would
proceed to consider whether wrongful birth statutes are substantially
related to these goals. Other possible justifications that have been of-
fered by legislatures include: "reducing the number of medical mal-
practice actions"; reducing "the cost of medical malpractice
insurance"; avoiding dictating how physicians should perform; treating
a developmentally disabled child the same as other children; and
preventing actions in which the damages award would be specula-
tive.'" These purposes arguably are not descriptive of wrongful birth
statutes. Even if a court accepts these purposes, denying parents a
claim for wrongful birth is not a substantially related means to achieve
their goals.
Three of the justifications above posit concern for the role of the
doctor. A concern over the costs of malpractice, however, does not
justify a discriminatory statute. First, wrongful birth actions would not
succeed if the doctor acted within the standards of the profession;
therefore, if doctors act within the proper standard of care, the cost of
176. Id at 725. Professor Siegel suggests that courts ask: "[I]n what ways might
assumptions about the proper roles of men and women have moved the state to en-
gage in fetal life-saving by compelling pregnancy? What view of women prompted
the state's decision to use them as a means to an end?" Siegel, supra note 169, at 360.
177. See supra part II.C.
178. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724-25.
179. Id
180. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1988); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 299, 315 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977); see also
Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 20 (Minn. 1986) (Amdahl, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that the United States Supreme Court has recognized these two
purposes). The second legislative purpose listed could be rephrased as encouraging
childbirth.
181. Dansby v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 623 A.2d 816, 820-21 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1993) (discussing the possible justifications for wrongful birth statutes).
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malpractice should not increase. In addition, wrongful birth actions
require the same showing of negligence as other forms of malpractice;
consequently, they neither unjustifiably nor disproportionately con-
tribute to the cost of medicine. Moreover, there is no collateral re-
quirement that doctors perform unnecessary tests or warn patients
about improbable risks that might increase the cost of practicing
medicine. Finally, although cost is a legitimate legislative concern,
there is no evidence that the malpractice awards stemming from
wrongful birth actions contribute disproportionately to the total
amount of malpractice awards.
Avoiding mandates about the manner in which doctors practice
medicine is an important way to respect physician's moral objections
to certain activities. While protecting the conscience of the physician
is a valuable goal, in this instance, the doctor is not forced to provide
an abortion, which is the objectionable activity."s Unless the doctor
has a conscience-based objection to providing information, this justifi-
cation fails to focus on the nature of the tort.ls 3 Although an element
of the tort includes that the woman would have chosen an abortion, if
the doctor had provided the proper information but refused to per-
form an abortion, the parents would not have a cause of action for
lack of a breach of duty. Consequently, wrongful birth actions, similar
to informed consent statutes, only compel doctors to provide informa-
tion about the status of the fetus. They do not require the doctor to
provide abortions, the activity that may offend a doctor's conscience.
Proponents of wrongful birth statutes worry that wrongful birth ac-
tions will treat developmentally disabled children differently than
other children and, consequently, debase the value of life.", In fact,
by discouraging the discovery and sharing of information, wrongful
birth statutes demean the value of the woman's life and risk danger to
the child. If doctors are encouraged to discover the condition of the
fetus at an early stage and share that information with the patient,
parents can seek out additional reliable information about the poten-
tial lifestyle of the impaired child and even research partial or com-
plete remedies to the condition. In addition, this tort focuses on the
right to information and the right to autonomous decision-making; ac-
cordingly, the denial of these rights has no relation, much less a sub-
stantial relation, to the value of life.
182. The doctor can even refuse to perform some genetic tests, leaving a referral as
the only legal requirement on the doctor. Wrongful Birth Actions, supra note 68, at
2031.
183. Even if the doctor has an objection to providing certain health information,
the duty to act within the standards of the profession mandates adherence to the
accepted medical standard, notwithstanding any moral obligations. Id. at 2032.
184. It is important to remember in this context that the "injury alleged in wrongful
birth is neither the birth nor the life of the child; it is the denial of the parents' funda-
mental right to exercise their choice in private reproductive matters." Id. at 2030.
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Legislators' concerns about permitting a speculative tort action
have been answered, in large part, by the courts. Most courts envision
wrongful birth actions as extensions of medical malpractice law.'8 5
They have rejected the notion that proving causation in wrongful birth
actions presents great difficulty. Moreover, many courts have admit-
ted that calculating damages requires no extraordinary efforts by
courts.186 Consequently, wrongful birth statutes cannot be justified as
preventing the recognition of a speculative tort. 8 7
B. The Legislative Means Are Not Substantially Related to the
Legislative Goals
Legislatures have justified abortion regulations on the grounds that
the regulations either encourage childbirth over abortion or protect
the health of the mother. The latter concern seems inapposite the
purpose of wrongful birth statutes. Contrary to a concern over the
health of the mother, wrongful birth statutes remove doctors' incen-
tives to convey critical health information. The goal of encouraging
childbirth over abortion is more relevant in the context of wrongful
birth statutes. The Supreme Court has validated this goal and ap-
proved states' abortion regulations in the interest of encouraging
childbirth. 18 8 Thus, a state might claim that wrongful birth statutes
display a preference for childbirth over abortion. Wrongful birth stat-
utes, however, are not substantially related to the goal of encouraging
childbirth, or its corollary, deterring abortion. Because states already
regulate abortion directly,'89 wrongful birth statutes are too far re-
moved to accomplish the goal of deterring abortion. Moreover, the
tort focuses initially on the communication of health information.
Consequently, the legislature will have more success encouraging
childbirth by directly regulating abortion. In light of the holding in
many of the abortion cases, the Court seems unlikely to sanction the
185. See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
186. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813 (N.Y. 1978) ("Calculation of damages
necessary to make plaintiffs whole [in their wrongful birth action] ... requires nothing
extraordinary."); see supra notes 47-60 and accompanying text.
187. One commentator reveals that the statutes also have been justified as prevent-
ing the risk that the tort will expand uncontrollably. See Wrongful Birth Actions, supra
note 68, at 2033. Legislators worry that recognition of this tort will lead to related tort
claims in the area of eugenics. Id This commentator concludes, however, that this
justification is unlikely to persuade the Court to deny relief to injured parents because
the tort is limited by the confines of traditional negligence actions, including proof of
duty, breach, cause, and injury. Id. Moreover, the Court is likely to prefer the imposi-
tion of limitations on the scope of the tort rather than further penalizing already in-jured parents. Id.
188. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 509 (1988); Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 299, 315 (1979); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977).
189. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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manipulation of information as an acceptable method to regulate
abortion.1"
Wrongful birth statutes fail intermediate scrutiny because the legis-
latures' proffered justifications do not meet the "important" standard
established by the Supreme Court for gender-based discrimination.
Furthermore, although two justifications passed the first part of the
equal protection analysis, they failed on the analysis' second part.
Wrongful birth statutes are not substantially related to the accepted
justifications of favoring childbirth over abortion or protecting the
health of the mother. Therefore, wrongful birth statutes are unconsti-
tutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
Wrongful birth statutes blatantly contradict the trend toward full
informed choice, and reinforce the historical stereotype of women as
incapable of making important health decisions. These statutes dis-
criminate on the basis of gender by removing a critical incentive from
doctors to provide women with health information. In addition, legis-
lators have failed to offer a substantial justification for this discrimina-
tion. Therefore, carving out causes of action for wrongful birth from
the broader right to make informed health decisions violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
190. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
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